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THE METAPHOR OF THE COVENANT 
IN HABERMASI 
Sander Griffioen 
This essay discusses the idea of covenant in Habennas' social philosophy. It 
does so by attempting to shed light on the kind of universality which 
Habennas claims for communicative reason and by examining the limitations 
of this universality. The metaphor of "atoning remembrance," as used by 
Habennas in the "Historians' debate," is also considered. The essay concludes 
with some observations regarding the relevance of the covenant idea for 
"public philosophy." 
In The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Jiirgen Habermas offers a fas-
cinating comparison between the binding force of communicative reason and 
the covenant made by Yahweh and the people of Israel. "Covenant" is not 
among Habermas' central metaphors; indeed he introduces it here only by 
way of a reference to another author. Nevertheless, as I will show, it is 
worthwhile exploring the significance that the covenant idea might have for 
Habermas' thought. What is implied when Habermas, the foremost defender 
of the Enlightenment project in the area of social philosophy, emphatically 
endorses the claim that the concept of "enlightenment" is only conceivable 
as a "covenant" or "confederation"? And what, if anything, can such a thought 
contribute to Christian social thought? 
Exclusion and Inclusion 
The passage in question occurs in Lecture XI of The Philosophical Dis-
course.2 In one of the early sections of this lecture, entitled "Communicative 
versus Subject-Centered Reason," Habermas considers the kind of 
postmodern critique of the Enlightenment set forth by Foucault and others. 
This critique portrays the ideal of reason as inherently oppressive. Reason, 
the argument goes, can only exclude, and thus marginalise, everything that 
does not fit its mold. The critics accusingly point to the rationalist's depre-
ciation of nature, the human body, fantasy, desire, and the feelings.3 
Habermas sets up his defense against this critique by distinguishing be-
tween subject-centered reason and communicative reason. The postmoderns, 
he agrees, rightly criticize the "exclusion model of reason" (p. 306). However, 
he hastens to add, the exclusion model only applies to "subject-centered 
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reason," i.e., reason reduced to the instruments of cognition and purposive 
action (pp. 305-14); or, put simply, the view of reason propagated by 
Descartes and his followers. In this sense, indeed, reason is "a product of 
division and usurpation" (p. 316). With respect to communicative reason, 
however, Habermas insists that it is based in the integrating powers of human 
communication, and that therefore the postmodern critique of this kind of 
reason is far off target. Its area of application thus enlarged, reason would 
not be divisive but community-building. 
The integrating function of reason involves among other things the exten-
sion of the criteria of rationality from the cognitive-instrumental dimension 
to the moral-practical domain; rationality, then, is not just a matter of prop-
ositional truth, but also of normative rightness (pp. 314-15).4 One example 
of the application of this norm is the distinction between successful and 
unsuccessful communication which we will meet at various places in this 
essay. 
At this juncture, Habermas faces a new objection. How can communication 
be rational and still be conditioned by material life processes (p. 321)? Is not 
the whole idea of communication thoroughly idealistic? Obviously the 
postmodern critics are now being joined by his old Marxist friends. Has he 
not exchanged materialism for an idealism of universalistic validity claims 
(p. 321)? Habermas now needs to show that the "ideal" is not cut off from 
the "real." Successful interaction, he argues, requires ideal conditions; in 
particular it requires that there be no significant inequality between partici-
pants with respect to power. While engaged in communication one has to 
presuppose that these conditions have indeed been met: this much is implied 
by being under the sway of the norm of rationality. However, when viewed 
by outsiders-or, as he puts it, when viewed from a "third-person perspec-
tive" (p. 324)-one becomes aware of the actual limitations. In this respect 
no process of communication is ever without obstacles, such as asymmetric 
power relations, conflicts, etc. (pp. 322-24). 
The distinction between successful and unsuccessful interaction is opera-
tive in yet another way. The objection that the tradition of rational thought, 
starting with Parmenides, has consistently discriminated between the "few 
who are in the truth" and "the many who stay behind in the darkness of their 
blindness" (p. 324) is part and parcel of the criticisms mentioned above. 
Replying to the accusation that the theory of communicative action remains 
caught in this elitism, Habermas retorts that it emphatically does not separate 
knowledge and ignorance in the Parmenidian sense of a hierarchy of two 
different communities. Those who do not live by the light of reason are not 
set apart in an inferior form of life. Rather, their "irrationality" is understood 
as "unsuccessful communication" which as such remains linked to "success-
ful communication." Or put differently, Habermas tries to make clear that the 
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nonn of rationality is not divisive. Its application does not result in two 
opposing forms of life: successful and unsuccessful interaction pertain to one 
"common fonn of life" (p. 324). 
It is within this context that the tenns "covenant" (Bund) and "confederation" 
(Bundesgenossenschaft) emerge (p. 325). It is especially intriguing that the 
text is not silent about the biblical moorings of the term "covenant." Accord-
ing to Klaus Heinrich, whom Habennas quotes here, the model of the kind of 
confederation which is meant here is the covenant of Yahweh with the people 
of Israel. Just as God's wrath against sin protects the covenant, so communicative 
reason has its own dialectic of "betrayal and vengeance." The confederation 
is "a potentially universal confederation against betrayal" (p. 325). 
It is not easy to understand what exactly is meant by "betrayal" and "ven-
geance." Yet even at this early stage of our argument it is becoming clear that 
the emphasis is on inclusion. Those who do not live by the light of reason 
are not excluded and marginalised, but remain within its bounds. Let it be 
noted that the very idea of universality is inclusively conceived. The universal 
as it is meant here does not originate from the abstraction of all particulars. 
Rather, it results from the integration of the particulars. And there is even 
more to it than that. In keeping with dialectical thought in general, the inclu-
sion is also meant to extend to those cases where the particular obtains the 
character of the negative, i.e., of something contradicting the ideal. To get 
clearer on this we will look at Hegel's account of the dialectic. 
Hegel and Dialectical Inclusion 
The idea of dialectical inclusion has found its most powerful expression in 
the thought of Hegel. He is the one who in The Phenomenology of Mind 
emphatically stated that the power of "spirit" does not take the form of "a 
positive which turns away from the negative"; but that "spirit is this power 
only by looking the negative in the face, and dwelling with it"; "this dwelling 
beside," he continued, "is the magic power that converts the negative into 
being."5 It is important to see that Habennas no longer believes in Hegelian 
magic. "Reconciliation" has become in his thought an ideal, rather than a 
reality. In this respect the distance between their philosophies is considerable. 
But in one important respect Habermas is still inspired by Hegel's vision: the 
"dwelling beside" spells out the essence of solidarity. Put briefly, Hegel's 
model of reconciliation forms the basis for understanding Habermas' affir-
mation of solidarity. 
Habermas' main interest concerns one particular theme of the younger 
Hegel's. In The Philosophical Discourse, just after the extensive quotation 
from Heinrich's book, he notes that the dialectic of betrayal and vengeance 
has a close analogy in an early fragment from Hegel on crime and punishment 
(p. 325). In other places one finds similar references to this dialectic. 6 The 
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manuscript referred to is entitled The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate; it 
dates from 1798-99, i.e., some 10 years before The Phenomenology appeared 
(1807). 
The fundamental assumption of The Spirit is that ethical life (Sittlichkeit) 
forms a totality. Within its bounds communality is unavoidable. Committing 
a crime under these conditions means to alienate oneself from the ethical 
totality. Or put more strongly: it means to violate one's own life. As a con-
sequence, the totality itself turns into an alien, punishing force. The destruc-
tion of life turns life into an enemy. Consequently, the criminal suffers 
because of his alienation.? Hegel illustrates the turning of life into an enemy 
by a reference to Macbeth. Macbeth kills Banquo, who had approached him 
as a friend; Banquo, instead of vanishing, returns as an haunting spirit. What 
is true of Macbeth holds for every trespasser: "In his arrogance he has de-
stroyed indeed, but only the friendliness of life; he has perverted life into an 
enemy" (p. 229). 
The dialectic of crime and punishment is itself part of a larger whole. The 
main subject of Hegel's manuscript is the reconciliation of "fate" in love. 
Fate is the alien, inimical aspect of reality. The manuscript opens with a 
chapter on the "spirit of Judaism." In Hegel's account, the Old Testament 
remains enclosed within the horizon of "fate." Israel is a people of slaves 
placed under a stern master who rules by command.8 Rebellion against bond-
age can only have the fateful result of leading to a further destruction of the 
friendliness of life. It is at this juncture that Hegel for the first time introduces 
Macbeth. The fate of the Jewish people, he says, is similar to that of Macbeth, 
who "clung to alien Beings, and so in their service had to trample and slay 
everything holy in human nature" (p. 205). 
In (neo-)gnostic fashion Hegel then contrasts the New Testament as the 
Gospel of love to the darkness of the Old Testament. Jesus frees us from fate; 
in love fate is reconciled (p. 232). The dialectical movement ends with the 
"reestablishment of the disintegrated totality. "9 "Life can heal its wounds 
again"; Hegel anticipates here (p. 230) his famous formulation in The Phe-
nomenology of Mind: "The wounds of the spirit heal without leaving scars."10 
However, for Hegel a genuine reconciliation lies beyond the New Testament. 
In Jesus only an abstract reconciliation is attained, one situated in an ideal 
world: a kingdom not of this earth. His "tragedy" was that he could not free 
himself entirely from the fate of his people (p. 285); it was this fate that killed 
him.ll 
As indicated earlier, in The Philosophical Discourse Habermas repeatedly 
returns to the dialectic of ethical life. In responding to an interviewer's ques-
tion, Habermas offers an interesting parallel. 12 Asked what animates his phi-
losophizing, he refers to a "foundational intuition," viz., that community and 
individuality are not per se at odds. This inspiring vision, he goes on to say, 
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is one of a communality in which the friendliness of life is experienced-
however, leaving room for conflicts. Once again Hegel is mentioned as one 
source of such representations of successful interaction. 13 
Indeed, Hegel's significance for our theme is considerable, in at least two 
respects. First, in both Hegel and Habermas the emphasis on communality is 
part of an attempt to overcome a certain narrowness in the Enlightenment 
tradition, especially as represented by Kant. In The Spirit of Christianity 
Hegel contrasts the Gospel of love both with Mosaic law and with Kant's 
ethics (pp. 213-14; 211n). Even though Kant is mentioned only a few times, 
it is not an exaggeration to say that throughout this entire manuscript the 
"Moses of modem ethics" is present in the immediate background. In fact, 
within Hegel's development this essay represents the first clear attempt to 
transcend Kant's ethics. 14 In a similar vein, Habermas presents "communica-
tive reason" as the answer to the limitations of the early Enlightenment, 
especially the ideal of subject-centered reason which dominated the early 
Enlightenment thought during the period, roughly speaking, from Descartes 
to Kant. 
Let it be understood, though, that neither Hegel nor Habermas wants to 
abandon the Enlightenment project. In Hegel's case one could speak of a 
radicalization. Kant had taught that for freedom to prevail, human inclina-
tions, emotions, and passions need to be brought under the rule of reason. 
Hegel objects, however, that a person whose inclinations are in bondage to 
reason is still a slave, though a slave to himself. 15 Freedom requires that the 
hegemony of reason be replaced by the self-rule of love. Immediately, one is 
aware of the parallel to the way in which Habermas faces the postmodern 
critique of reason, viz., by dissociating the rule of reason from all historical 
connotations of hegemony, and by stressing instead that the binding force of 
reason be understood as issuing only from the basic solidarity of people living 
together. 16 
Second, it has become apparent that "the avenging force" is (for the most 
part) modelled on Hegel's idea of the causality of fate. Both Hegel and 
Habermas assume that ethical reality is, so to speak, responsive to human 
action: to those who accept the ethical bond life shows its friendliness; to 
those who, for whatever reason, become estranged from this bond or rebel 
against it, it turns into an avenging force. 
In all of this, though, both Hegel and Habermas remain true to the tenets 
of the Enlightenment. Revenge, punishment, and the like, only appear to 
come as heteronomous forces. In fact, the criminal punishes himself. Hegel 
explains: "the sinner is more than a sin existent" (p. 238), i.e., the crime does 
not exhaust the being of the criminal, for he remains part of the ethical 
totality. Therefore, just as much as his crime turns against himself, his ethical 
being turns against his crime. This then opens the way to a solution: the inner 
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conflict leading to remorse and to reconciliation. Similarly, as indicated ear-
lier, Habermas places "betrayal" in the light of reconciliation. His aim is to 
formulate a model of dialectical inclusion in order to face the postmodern 
accusation of exclusivity. 
Habermas, to be sure, is much less confident than Hegel was that reconcil-
iation will in fact come about. Here the difference arises to which I alluded 
earlier. While "communality" may be unavoidable for Habermas, it does not 
lead automatically to the acceptance of "communal responsibility."17 It re-
quires people to make a covenant against betrayal. 
Covenant and Betrayal 
Even after a superficial reading of The Spirit of Christianity one notices 
that its author misunderstands the biblical portrayal of God's covenantal 
relationship with his people. Hegel simply takes the Old Testament as the 
embodiment of legalism. 18 
As indicated above, the metaphor of the covenant is introduced in The 
Philosophical Discourse not through Hegel but via a lengthy quotation from 
Klaus Heinrich. 19 Heinrich is a student of religion with a special interest in 
the relation of myth to revelation. His interpretation of both is inspired by 
Paul Tillich. 
The first part of the quote introduces the covenant as a symbol. It leads up 
to an idea which we have already noted, betrayal as self-betrayal: 
Keeping the covenant with God is the symbol of fidelity; breaking this cov-
enant is the model of betrayal. To keep faith with God is to keep faith with 
life-giving Being itself-in oneself and others. To deny it in any domain of 
being means breaking the covenant with God and betraying one's own foun-
dation ... Thus, betrayal of another is simultaneously betrayal of oneself. (p. 
325). 
Heinrich then argues that the biblical covenant is universal because in prin-
ciple it excludes no one. The "prophetic tradition" from which it stems differs 
radically from Greek philosophy. From Parmenides on, Greek tradition 
sought the Good Life in an ideal realm, situated above or behind the ambi-
guities of everyday life. Heinrich presumes that this ideal issues from an ethos 
of resignation . 
... and every protest against betrayal is not just protest in one's own name, 
but in the name of the other at the same time .... The idea that each being is 
potentially a "covenant partner" in the fight against betrayal, including any-
one who betrays himself and me, is the only counterbalance against the stoic 
resignation already formulated by Parmenides when he made a cut between 
those who know and the mass of the ignorant (p. 325). 
Heinrich's contention is that the European Enlightenment stands in this pro-
phetic tradition. Basically, he argues, it is not after an esoteric knowledge 
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that is accessible to only an elite; it seeks to enlighten all. The final sentence 
of the quotation brings the argument to a climax: "The concept of enlighten-
ment familiar to us is unthinkable without the concept of a potentially uni-
versal confederation against betrayal. "20 
Although it would be wrong to suggest that Heinrich's name occurs on every 
other page of Habermas' works, it is nevertheless significant that the attention 
Philosophical Discourse pays to him does have parallels in earlier works. As 
early as 1964 Habermas published a review of Heinrich's Versuch iiber die 
Schwierigkeit nein zu sagen. Some years later, in 1967, he included an excursus 
on Heinrich's ideas in his lengthy discussion of Gadamer's Wahrheit und 
MethodeY In the 2nd edition of Zur Logik der SozialwissenschaJten (1970) 
the original review was republished (pp. 322-29), to be reissued once more 
in Philosophisch-politische Profile (1981).22 
There is much in the 1964 review with which we are already more or less 
familiar, especially the contrast between the Greek ideal of a harmonious 
totality on the one hand-a cosmos that is freed from the vicissitudes of 
everyday life-and on the other hand the commitment of the "prophets of 
Israel" to "a universal confederation" directed at the reconciliation of those 
who have betrayed the covenant. 
In one respect the review is certainly illuminating: it makes us understand 
somewhat better the meaning of "betrayal" in this connection. "Betrayal" is 
linked to two forms of alienation affecting in our days the relationship of the 
individual to society (or to a segment of it). The first form is that of a complete 
identification of the individual with the collective. The second is that of 
isolation. Whereas the first leads to destruction of the individual self, the 
second leads to destruction of the social bond. 
Habermas seems to have been attracted by the link here with language and 
communication. Heinrich argues that both identification and separation leave 
the individual speechless (sprachlos). Speech implies a difference between 
speaker and hearer, which disappears once complete identification prevails. 
But in a state of isolation the individual becomes speechless as well. One 
recognizes here, of course, the argument against the possibility of "private 
languages." A living language is a social phenomenon. To be human is to 
speak; to speak is to be related to a wider community. Hence, in both forms 
of alienation, to bring about healing it is necessary that communication be 
resumed. In communication dwells the power of reconciliation.23 
Bit by bit we are getting a better grasp of what is meant by that mysterious 
word "betrayal." Identification and separation are the two shapes betrayal 
takes in our days. But one point still remains to be clarified. Who betrays 
whom? Who are the traitors? The individuals who isolate themselves, or those 
who disappear into the collective? Or aren't these individuals rather the 
victims of impersonal social forces? 
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Both Heinrich and Habermas evade the question of individual guilt. The 
reason, or so it seems to me, why they remain elusive in the matter of betrayal, 
is that both regard it as a collective phenomenon rather than as something to 
be imputed individually. Heinrich is reluctant to contrast covenant-keepers 
and covenant-breakers as two opposing groups of people. Significantly, the 
one great representative of the prophetic tradition, the prophet Jonah, is not 
unambiguously on one side of the line. Rather, he is portrayed as someone 
who himself betrayed the covenant. (Heinrich even speaks of a triple betrayal: 
of himself, by trying to escape his calling; of God; and of life, because he 
wanted to be dead.24) Hence Heinrich's preference for the phrase "context of 
guilt. "2S Habermas, in a parallel text of The Philosophical Discourse, states 
expressis verbis that "fault," Schuld, should be taken in an intersubjective 
sense only: 
that is, in the sense of an involuntary product of an entanglement that, how-
ever things stand with individual accountability, communicative agents 
would have to ascribe to communal responsibility. 
He illustrates this with the effects of suicide: 
It is not by chance that suicides set loose a type of shock among those close 
to them, which allows even the most hardhearted to discover something of 
the unavoidable communality of such a fate. 26 
It is certainly true that Habermas does not uncritically take his cue from 
Heinrich. His distinction between religious and philosophical languages is a 
sharper one. The notion of confederation (Bundesgenossenschaft) he charac-
terizes as a "religious motif." This motif, he continues, has been raised to 
philosophical status in the (read: Habermas') theory of communicative ac-
tion-as had been the case with pragmatism beforeY As a consequence, his 
use of "covenant" and "confederation" is (even) looser than Heinrich's. To 
him these are helpful models illuminating certain intuitions, yet not requiring 
a religious commitment on the part of the users. Significantly, the indetermi-
nate word "can" is used to indicate the relation of communicative theory to 
the Old Testament: this theory, Habermas states, is guided by an intuition that 
can be expressed in the concepts of the Old Testament. Apparently, it could 
be expressed in other concepts as well, with the help of metaphors borrowed 
from other religious sources. A case in point is his own use of the idea of an 
atonement of the past, a metaphor which, via Walter Benjamin, harks back 
(mainly) to Jewish mysticism. 
The Historians' Debate: Solidarity and Distance 
In the very first chapter of The Philosophical Discourse Habermas dedi-
cates an excursus to Walter Benjamin's "Theses on the Philosophy of His-
tory,"28 at the center of which the idea is found that the past can and must be 
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reconciled through remembering. At an earlier stage this theme had already 
received some attention: Haberrnas' contribution to the volume Zur A ktualitiit 
Walter Benjamins (Frankfurt, 1972) focussed on the enigmatic thesis that "a 
weak messianic force has been given to us to which the past can lay claim."29 
Note that this is only a weak messianic power: past unjustices cannot be 
made undone;30 it is the "weak anamnestic power of a solidarity that later 
generations can continue to practice only in the medium of a remem-
brance .... "31 But it is messianic nevertheless: the past "can at least be virtu-
ally reconciled through remembering." Haberrnas also speaks of an atoning 
effect, as in a recent interview with Jean Mary Ferry: "We certainly cannot 
make past suffering and injustice good; but we do have the weak power of 
an atoning remembrance. "32 
The historians' debate was sparked off by an article published on June 6, 
1986 by the German historian Ernst Nolte, in the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung. Nolte's contention was that the annihilation of the Jews had been a 
reaction to Stalin's Gulag Archipelago. 33 In this article, the uniqueness of the 
Nazi atrocities was reduced to the "technical procedure of gassing. "34 
Haberrnas soon joined the debate. In an essay published in Die Zeit (July 11, 
1986), under the title "Apologetic Tendencies," he accused Nolte, together 
with other historians of similar tendencies (e.g., A. Hill gruber, M. StUrmer, 
J. Fest), of an apologetic revision of the German past. 35 
Habermas does not want to relinquish in any sense the responsibility for 
the past. How could one, he asks, "become the legal successor to the German 
Reich and continue the traditions of German culture without taking on his-
torical liability for the form of life in which Auschwitz was possible?"36 
The only legitimate way to master the past is "remembrance, practiced in 
solidarity" (p. 236). It means keeping alive "the memory of the sufferings of 
those who were murdered by German hands." The "Benjaminian legacy" is 
the conviction that it is precisely "these dead who have a claim to the weak 
anamnestic power of solidarity. "37 What effects is historical solidarity sup-
posed to have? What does reconciliation mean? Is it more than burning 
candles for the dead? Habermas offers several hints. At one point he asserts 
that those who do remember act "as though they could still somehow render 
the pastness of an irreparable calamity less definitive"38; elsewhere he states 
that without such an anamnestic solidarity his Jewish fellow citizens would 
not be able to breathe in Germany.39 In the interview with Ferry he mentions 
that "this sensibility for innocent victims ... produces a reflexive distance to-
wards one's own traditions";4o the latter statement has several parallels in The 
New Conservatism (pp. 205, 251, 262-63, 266). However important these 
clues prove to be, though, in order to clarify the picture we first need to 
determine the connection with our earlier discussions of Hegel and Heinrich. 
Strictly speaking the relation between this new theme and the subject that 
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we have been discussing is indirect rather than direct. This is because the 
notion that we have a responsibility for what past generations have innocently 
suffered has no analogy in Hegel, either in his early works, or in his later 
writings. Nevertheless, there is a certain relationship between this new theme 
and what we have been discussing up to now. Habermas, in the present 
context, offers a new application of Hegel's idea of a totality of ethical life. 
He applies it, one might say, retrospectively to the past. Remembrance "ties 
up the present with the communicative context of universal historical soli-
darity. "41 By fusing Benjamin's theme of remembrance with Hegel's doctrine 
of the unavoidable communality of fate, he attempts to articulate the collec-
tive responsibility of the present generation for the Third Reich era. 
Naturally, as an implication of the idea of an ethical totality one expects 
to find a parallel to Hegel's concept of a dialectical reconciliation. Indeed, 
in this context too reconciliation does have a dialectical moment. A case in 
point is Habermas' sharp distinction between two different attitudes towards 
national identity. While he feels that the patriotism of the apologetic histori-
ans rests in an uncritical, "immediate" identification with the so-called "na-
tional tradition," he himself advocates a critical weighing of traditions. The 
parallel is that "patriotism" in the latter case would imply the "reflexive 
distance" mentioned in the Ferry interview (see supra). Some qualifications 
indicating such a distance are "post-national,"42 "post-traditional," and "post-
conventional. "43 
Habermas' attitude towards patriotism also provides a basis for a compar-
ison with Heinrich's views. Just as the latter, Habermas wants to steer clear 
of both "identification" and "separation." Whereas, on the one hand, he ad-
amantly rejects any "immediate" identification with the German past, on the 
other hand he also turns against those who refuse to accept any responsibility. 
We are responsible for "those who were murdered by German hands. "44 One 
recognizes in the rejected positions the two shapes "betrayal" took in 
Heinrich's account. Heinrich, as will be recalled, linked "betrayal" to two 
forms of alienation. The first form was a complete identification of the indi-
vidual with the collective, leading to a destruction of the individual self; the 
other took the shape of isolation ("separation") leading to a destruction of 
the social bond. 
Yet with the idea of a "reflexive distance" Habermas introduces an element 
which has no parallel in our earlier discussions. Solidarity becomes restricted to 
certain groups and specific traditions. What is missing here is the emphasis on 
the universal, all-inclusive character of solidarity. As will be recalled, a major 
ingredient of the metaphor of the covenant was the universal character of the 
confederation against betrayal. Not even the traitors were excluded. In Hegel's 
dialectic of crime and punishment it proved to be essential that the criminal, 
through the causality of fate, is brought to a reconciliation with the ethical 
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totality. Strictly speaking, this universal intent is lacking in Habermas' stance 
in the historians' debate. There is no solidarity with either the Nazi criminals or 
with the apologetic historians. In fact, Habermas even excludes his own past 
from the atoning remembrance. Significantly enough, the final words of The New 
Conservatism are: "the renunciation of our own disastrous traditions. "4S 
Covenant and Public Philosophy 
It is not uncommon for the Enlightenment to be interpreted in terms of 
contract and as such to be set over against covenant-traditions. William 
Sullivan's Reconstructing Public Philosophy may serve as an example.46 Fol-
lowing Robert Bellah's The Broken Covenant (1975), Sullivan sharply dis-
tinguishes between the tradition of the Enlightenment and the "civil 
tradition," and links the latter to both biblical and republican roots. He con-
siders a fundamental trust which can only be brought about by means of a 
"civil covenant." Enlightenment liberalism in his opinion lacks this moral 
quality: it only recognizes well-defined rights and duties. Civil tradition is 
guided by the "moral imperative to live according to the principles of justice 
and mutual support grounded in civil covenant."47 To put this in a different 
way: "Unlike the liberal idea of a contract, which emphasizes mutual obliga-
tions within clearly defined limits, a civic covenant is a bond of fundamental 
trust founded upon common commitment to a moral understanding. "48 
My impression is that Sullivan's approach is characteristic of much of 
North American "public philosophy." At any rate it is a salient feature of 
Habits of the Heart, which Sullivan co-authored with Robert Bellah and 
others. In this book the problem of North American society is diagnosed as 
the loss of a common public language. Individuals have become dependent 
on contractual forms of interaction, which cannot but undermine community 
life: "By its own logic, a purely contractual ethic leaves every commitment 
unstable. Parties to a contract remain free to choose, and thus free to remake 
or break every commitment, if only they are willing to pay the price for doing 
SO."49 
Important as this may be as a diagnosis of the present cultural predicament, 
our discussions point to one correction. The Enlightenment cannot be inter-
preted exclusively in contractarian terms. It is not insignificant that Jiirgen 
Habermas, who strongly endorses the ideals of the Enlightenment, never 
employs its social contract imagery in his endorsement. The reason is not 
difficult to fathom. Habermas too-just like Sullivan, Bellah and others-
starts from the norm of a basic solidarity. To articulate this he needs other 
metaphors than "contract": hence his sympathy for Heinrich's "covenant'" 
"confederation," and Benjamin's "remembrance." 
One can appreciate the fact that Habermas places so much emphasis on 
solidarity. I would insist even more strongly than he does that it be taken in 
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a universal sense. Responsibility does not exclude those who go divergent 
ways, who "betray" the causes we stand for. Although we argue against their 
convictions-or consent to their punishment in the case of crime (to return 
to Hegel's dialectic)-we do so because as fellow human beings we cannot 
stay indifferent to the public side of their lives. This "holding on to each other" 
I find attractive in the themes under discussion. Under conditions of religious-
cultural pluralism, without such a "holding on" the fragmentation of societal life 
is inescapable. In the absence of such a public ethos it is difficult to see any 
future for our society. Is it not this very solidarity which is conspicuously 
lacking in Northern Ireland and Lebanon? And is not the same spectre of 
anarchy now coming ex oriente as well, from Russia in particular? 
It is also important that the past not be excluded. Inspired by Benjamin, 
Habermas develops a similar theme to what Habits of the Heart has called 
"communities of memory." As indicated above, in Habermas choosing for 
solidarity with some traditions implies distancing oneself from others. Al-
though this "reflexive distance" seems to be at odds with the universalism of 
his communication idea, one cannot but agree that adherence to a tradition 
should never be unconditional. Traditions themselves have to be judged in 
the light of such norms as justice and love. 
Habermas makes no secret of the fact that his fundamental intuitions are 
of a religious nature. One can appreciate the fact that he does account for the 
extra-philosophical origins of the ideas he is propounding. For instance, in 
the context of Benjamin's "atoning remembrance" he openly acknowledges 
that "atonement" is a Christian term.50 But does this mean that he breaks with 
the Enlightenment ideal of a philosophy which is self-contained, independent 
of religion? Passing from intuitions to philosophical articulations, there is no 
evidence of a breakthrough. Although it is clear that to him religion is not 
simply passe, and although he does occasionally express a personal attach-
ment to the "Judeo-Christian" tradition,51 he does finally insist upon the 
subordination of religion. In that section of The Philosophical Discourse 
where the main theme we have been concerned with is developed, he qualifies 
his agreement with Heinrich's views on "covenant" and "confederation" with 
the assertion that this "religious motif' is raised to philosophical rank in the 
theory of communicative action (p. 325).52 The "raising to philosophical 
rank," of course, boils down to what Hegel meant with Aufhebung, viz., a 
process in which religious truth is stripped of its religious form, and appro-
priated philosophically. 
It is true that one significant difference remains vis-a-vis Hegel. The "Auf-
hebung" in Habermas' case is less definitive. The religious metaphors keep 
returning. In this respect, Habermas' philosophy is less "post-religious," and 
therefore more challenging, than I myself had long surmised. He warily 
accepts co-existence with religion: "As long as in its own search for founda-
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tions it [i.e., communicative reason] can find no better words to say what 
religion can say it will cautiously co-exist with the latter ...... 53 But in fact 
even a certain dependency obtains: as long as the point omega of total con-
ceptual transparence is not reached, his philosophy stays dependent on reli-
gious metaphors to articulate basic intuitions. 
There is certainly something modest about this philosophy. It does not 
pretend to be able to improve on the message of religion. In the final analysis, 
however, this is just modesty and not genuine openness. The idea of commu-
nication remains as Habermas' horizon. It is equivalent to Hegel's "ethical 
totality" both in scope and closedness. Although Habermas readily grants that 
there is much within this horizon that (as yet) withstands full conceptualiza-
tion, he does not relativize the idea of communication as such. Charles Taylor, 
in his recent Sources of the Self, rightly criticizes him on this score. Although 
agreeing with Habermas that without language there cannot be a "self," he 
rejects the claims made on its behalf: 
The fact that the self is constituted through exchange in language ... doesn't 
in any way guarantee us against loss of meaning, fragmentation, the loss of 
substance in our human environment and our affiliations.54 
One might object that at least at one point a specific qualification is intro-
duced, viz., where Habermas brings in the element of "reflexive distance." 
Did not Habermas in fact restrict the orbit of communication in the historians' 
debate? Did not certain traditions and groups of persons become "ex-com-
municated"? Although in one sense I can appreciate this "reflexive distance," 
it is not an altogether positive factor. Critical reflex ion appears to come from 
the outside. Thus communication is being restricted externally, rather than 
being opened up internally towards another reality. 
Let me come quickly to my final point. Enlightenment is understood by 
Heinrich/Habermas as a (potentially) universal confederation against be-
trayal. However, the historians' debate shows that Habermas is not really true 
to his universalist creed. In remembering the victims of the Third Reich the 
idea of universal solidarity collapses. The Nazi crimes form a kind of betrayal 
for which there is no atonement. 
Universal solidarity would require an openness which is lacking in 
Habermas. Loving our enemies is only possible on the basis of something 
originating from beyond our horizon: God's image-in criminals, too. Ac-
knowledgement of the imago Dei does not make crimes less serious, but it 
does widen the scope of human solidarity. The late Meyer Smit, of the Vrije 
Universiteit, put it this way. 
What takes precedence before all else, rather, is the reality of being created 
in God's image, of being placed in relation to Him: and man can never fall 
from this relation however deep he indeed may fall, which is to say that man 
can never lose or escape the meaning of history (see Romans).S5 
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From this it follows that "holding on to one another" within the public realm 
requires a religious foundation. But since every appeal to a religious founda-
tion is bound to meet with strong disagreement, one cannot but conclude that 
in the public realm universal solidarity and (recognition of) deep divisions 
go hand in hand. This indeed is my conclusion. I am not sure that both sides 
have been acknowledged fully in "public philosophy." As Charles Taylor 
suggests, there may indeed be a parallel between Habermas and Bellah on 
this score: "Habermas, rather like Bellah and his associates, elides the expe-
riential problem under the public, as though the two could be solved for the 
price of one."56 The "experiential problem" refers to the experience of frag-
mentation, divisions, and especially to the loss of meaning.57 Rephrasing his 
argument in my own terms: recovering a public language by itself is not 
enough; one also needs to go back to, and live from the Root of solidarity. 
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam 
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